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Abstract- This paper introduces the concept of dynamic modelling 
for wide area and adaptive power system protection.  Although not 
limited to these types of protection schemes, these were chosen due 
to their potential role in solving a multitude of protection 
challenges facing future power systems.  The dynamic modelling 
will be implemented using a bespoke simulation environment.  
This tool allows for a fully integrated testing methodology which 
enables the validation of protection solutions prior to their 
operational deployment.  Furthermore the paper suggests a 
distributed protection architecture, which when applied to existing 
and future protection schemes, has the potential to enhance their 
functionality and avoid mal-operation given that safety and 
reliability of power systems are paramount.  This architecture also 
provides a means to better understand the underlying dynamics of 
the aforementioned protection schemes and will be rigorously 
validated using the modelling environment. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is envisaged that future power systems will have 
different requirements so that they can operate more 
efficiently and meet security of supply regulations fully [1].  
Future power system will be more flexible such that they can 
be operated optimally for pre- and post-fault conditions as 
well as be able to accommodate future generation mixes.  
Flexibility is also manifested by the advent of Flexible AC 
Transmission Systems (FACTS) such as series and shunt 
compensation in addition to power electronics based tap 
changers.  Distributed Generation (DG) and especially 
generation capacity connected at the LV network in the form 
of micro-generation also poses new challenges in terms of 
protection and control [2]. 
Prevailing protection practices employ a fit and forget 
strategy where changes in settings usually involve manual 
adjustment by engineers when necessary (e.g. during network 
maintenance and reconfiguration).  As the aforementioned 
system changes come into play, it becomes more difficult to 
sustain a satisfactory protection scheme performance.  
Adaptive/pseudo adaptive and Wide Area Protection Systems 
(WAPS) are foreseen to be important enabling technologies 
for the development of future power systems.  Although at 
first glance WAPS may only be considered for transmission 
networks, some distribution network schemes may benefit 
greatly with system wide information.  This is particularly 
true in MV networks with relatively higher levels of 
interconnection and distributed generation capacities.  Due to 
the inherent risks associated with such protection schemes it 
is important to fully understand and qualify their 
performance.  The main risk lies in using protection schemes 
with changeable settings in a safety critical system without 
having an appropriate level of confidence in their 
performance.  In contrast to conventional distributed (non-
centralised) protection where functionality is determined by 
local measurement and fixed settings, the dynamic nature of 
WAPS and adaptive protection poses new challenges that 
impede their wide scale adoption [3].  Nevertheless, it is 
possible to devise schemes where WAPS, including adaptive 
functionality, can be monitored and verified continuously to 
ensure their correct operation in response to system events.  
Where the protection fails to operate satisfactorily, 
contingencies are in place to avoid catastrophic system 
collapse caused by cascades. Additionally monitoring the 
response of more conventional forms of protection can aid in 
the mitigation of such risks. 
This paper proposes a distributed protection architecture 
which aims to enable greater power system flexibility by 
continuous monitoring and management of protection 
schemes such that optimal operating conditions are created.  
Moreover, the dynamic modelling environment in question 
will act as a test harness through which the protection 
architecture can be validated by providing appropriate 
software modules to model the architecture and by managing 
inputs and outputs of a primary power system representation. 
 
II. WIDE AREA PROTECTION SYSTEMS 
A. Overview of Challenges 
Modern power systems are increasingly operating close to 
their stability limits [4].  A number of recent blackouts have 
raised awareness of this issue.  Steps have been put forward 
to prevent such occurrences including the use of WAPS 
which usually utilize information generated by phasor 
measurement units (PMUs) placed in strategic positions in a 
power system.  WAPS mainly carry out protection functions 
such as load shedding and voltage collapse protection to 
avoid the cascade effect of blackouts.  There are two major 
areas where protection schemes can benefit from wide area 
measurements – improved coordination as well as the 
potential for faster operation. 
There are, however, a number of challenges that impede 
the deployment of WAPS on a wider scale or even on lower 
levels of the power systems (i.e. the distribution network).  
Customised WAPS may not be able to cope with all network 
events if not designed correctly.  Improving their 
performance lies in the efficient and timely use of the wealth 
of information generated by wide area measurements.  
Increased levels of information, however, may come at the 
detriment of slower operation of the protection due to the 
processing time required.  Problems may also arise if the 
WAPS is of an adaptive nature.  Changing settings in a 
flexible power system require concrete procedures to produce 
valid protection scheme states. 
B. Current WAPS Practices 
WAPS schemes currently in use can range from voltage 
collapse protection to under frequency load shedding (UFLS) 
that serve the purpose of maintaining system stability and 
avoiding blackouts.  Conventional protection schemes, as of 
yet, have not made use of system wide information to 
enhance their functionality.  A number of such schemes have 
been discussed but they are limited to simulation studies [5]. 
Different WAPS regimes may be used.  These include 
enhancements to SCADA/EMS, flat architectures and 
multilayered architectures.  This structural aspect is critical 
when considering the flow of system wide information and 
the overall coordination of the scheme.  Particular regimes tie 
in closely with the distributed protection architecture under 
consideration. Consequently, the information exchange can 
be modelled readily which facilitates the understanding of the 
dynamics of WAPS data and its use. 
 
III. ADAPTIVE PROTECTION SCHEMES 
Adaptive Protection Schemes (APS) will be split into two 
types to simplify the following discussion.  The first type will 
be called fully adaptive where the protection scheme or relay 
calculates the optimum setting at any given time.  The second 
type will be referred to as pseudo adaptive where a number of 
predefined settings groups are available and selected from 
according to prevailing network conditions.  The latter has 
been chosen for consideration in this paper due to its relative 
simplicity and the opportunity to validate such schemes in a 
more straightforward manner.  It is also thought to bridge the 
gap between fully adaptive protection and conventional fixed 
setting protection. Moreover, adaptive settings can be applied 
in a WAPS based scheme. 
The adoption of adaptive protection schemes have been 
slow and largely confined to an academic environment.  
However a number of widespread schemes that are simple in 
nature and are taken for granted do actually represent a form 
of adaptive protection such as voltage controlled over current 
protection [6]. 
When settings groups are used, network conditions can be 
covered for by assigning predefined protection settings.  Fig. 
1 illustrates the universal space ‘U’ where all possible 
network conditions are represented.  A, B, and C represent 
three viable subsets of U, each of which defines a set of 
conditions for which one settings group holds.  It may be 
difficult to demarcate the boundaries of each subset so that it 
can only be protected by a distinct settings group – this is 
depicted by the shaded area in Fig. 1.  Such circumstances 
can be addressed in the design stage where specific criteria 
can be assigned to distinguish between the settings groups 
more clearly. 
 
IV. THE DISTRIBUTED PROTECTION ARCHITECTURE 
To better understand and facilitate the validation of future 
protection schemes, it is important to model such schemes 
and consider the various factors affecting their performance 
[7].  In order to achieve that, two steps must be taken.  First 
of all, a representative protection scheme model devised, 
namely the protection architecture which is illustrated in Fig. 
2.  Secondly, a validation process must be must be applied to 
the model.  This process is delivered by the dynamic 
modelling environment where it provides the means to 
emulate primary power system conditions and protection 
communications. 
The distributed architecture assumes a multi-layered 
(stacked) structure. Each layer serves an abstract function in 
an overall attempt to create a suitable structure for the 
modelling of WAPS and APS. The following is a brief 
description of the individual layers. 
A. Power System Information 
Information used by the protection architecture is made 
available through a pool of data.  This can be categorised into 
three subsets – primary quantities, phasor measurements and 
status data.  Primary quantities are those voltage and current 
measurements made by local instrument transducers.  On the 
other hand, system-wide phasor measurements are produced 
by PMUs.  Finally, status data generated by different 
apparatus are also utilised by the architecture. Status data is 
usually in the form of binaries or indications of the present 
state of particular pieces of equipment. 
B. Management Layer 
Utilising power system information and identifying the 
required scheme response are the main functions of the 
management layer.  It consists of two main functional 
elements: information handling algorithms and verification 
algorithms.  The former manages the information available to 
protection relays.  Each relay will require different amounts 
of information from different sources.  This is governed by  
 
Fig. 1.  System states and settings groups. 
 
factors such as redundancy (for reliability purposes) and the 
type of information.  Special algorithms deal with 
information passed to it from the power system information 
pool.  Relays are consequently fed with “filtered” information 
as appropriate.  Although the information handling element is 
shown as a single entity in Fig. 2, it is possible to use a 
distributed architecture where individual protection relays are 
capable of selecting relevant information from a broadcast or 
otherwise.  The verification algorithms, on the other hand, 
require two input streams to serve their function; these are 
information from the previous layer in addition to the 
protection scheme status which is represented by existing 
protection settings.  These inputs allow the verification 
algorithms to continuously monitor the status of the 
protection scheme with reference to network conditions.  
Consequently, these algorithms can authorise the operation of 
the protection scheme or block it accordingly.  Moreover, it 
can request the change between a set of predefined settings to 
create a more optimum state. The process in Fig. 3 shows, at 
a high level, how a typical verification algorithm may 
operate. As stated earlier, two sets of variables are 
continuously considered to determine the best choice of 
settings. It is possible that the verification algorithms may use 
some form of reliability or fault tree analysis for decision 
support [8]. 
C. Coordination Layer 
This layer is responsible for ensuring that the coordination 
between protection relays in a scheme is maintained.  
Coordination includes time grading, protection zone 
arrangement, etc.  Communication links are necessary to 
achieve the desired level of coordination.  The architecture of 
the communications infrastructure can take many forms, the 
choice of which is depicted by the protection scheme 
requirements and relative merits of each communications 
topology (i.e. cost, redundancy, throughput, etc).  Status data 
is most relevant to the coordination elements where a better 
understanding of the power system and protection topologies 
assists in delivering optimal protection settings. 
 
Fig. 2.  The Distributed Protection Architecture. 
 
Fig. 3.  Generic verification algorithm. 
D. Execution Layer 
This layer consists of conventional or adaptive protection 
algorithms with the latter having the ability to change 
between settings while in service.  The settings changes are 
managed and coordinated by the previous functional layers 
according to the network and protection scheme states.  In 
other words, the management and coordination layers are able 
to override or update the protection settings as appropriate.  It 
thus forms a closed loop feedback system where the relay 
performance can be continuously assessed.  The actual 
functionality of this layer can be delivered by either physical 
protection relays or dynamic software models of protection 
relays [9].  Although numerical protection relays are ideal for 
schemes where changing of settings is required, legacy relays 
can also be accommodated. The protection scheme with 
associated management and coordination functions will 
acknowledge this fact and operate accordingly. 
 
V. THE DYNAMIC MODELLING ENVIRONMENT 
A. Environment Functions 
The distributed protection architecture discussed in the 
previous section requires a laboratory-based validation 
procedure.  This is partly catered for by the dynamic 
modelling environment which performs three main functions.  
First of all, the environment feeds the appropriate primary 
power system information to the protection architecture under 
testing.  It also routes tripping signals from the architecture 
back to the appropriate power system apparatus in a format 
suitable for the particular test setup in place (the test setup is 
discussed in section VI).  Secondly, the environment provides 
a representative communications infrastructure fit for the 
protection scheme under consideration.  This infrastructure 
also enables internal information exchange between layers to 
ensure compatibility. The third function is responsible for 
dynamically simulating different network states with the 
assistance of the power system information pool.  Moreover, 
a user interface will be developed to allow monitoring the 
architecture’s behaviour as well as changing its underlying 
functional parameters if required. 
B. Environment and Architecture Implementation 
The environment requires a degree of modularity in order 
to carry out its functions fully, facilitate testing and easily 
encapsulate the distributed protection architecture for 
validation purposes.  This will be delivered to by a C++ 
based, object oriented engine. Moreover, precompiled 
libraries such as “SIM” and “CNCL” provide means of 
simulating discrete and event based dynamics which are 
applicable to the proposed protection architecture [10]. 
The modelling environment will be designed to be part of a 
larger integrated simulation system consisting of both 
software tools and hardware. This integrated simulation 
system can be thought of as a small scale power system 
simulator. Issues concerning interfaces and compatibility 
between the different components of the simulator need to be 
taken into account. Sound modular implementation and 
timely testing are key to mitigating these problems.  
 
VI. VALIDATION AND CASE STUDY 
The modelling environment is an integral part of the 
protection architecture’s validation.  However, a dedicated 
test setup is needed to complement the environment’s 
function.  Fig. 4 shows a typical test setup.  It includes a Real 
Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) to generate the power system 
information pool [11, 12].  On the other hand, the execution 
layer of the architecture is replaced by physical or modelled 
protection relays.  The modelling environment manages the 
information exchange between the relays and the remaining 
layers of the embedded protection architecture. 
A simple test scenario is presented here to illustrate the 
dynamics of the distributed protection architecture.  This is 
not meant to be a new protection scheme design.  The 
scenario is simply used to highlight the architecture’s 
functional layers when viewed from a pseudo adaptive 
protection scheme standpoint. This scenario is an example of 
a problem encountered in a UK distribution system.  This 
issue can be addressed using an adaptive protection scheme 
capable of changing between settings groups.  Consider Fig. 5 
which shows part of a primary substation.  A graded 
overcurrent scheme is in operation where the protection for 
circuit breaker 2 (CB2) is a backup of protection devices 
downstream of it.  Different current transformer (CT) ratios 
are used for the protection relays of CB1 and CB2.  Should 
CB1 fail to operate, the higher CT ratio used for CB3’s 
protection results in the prolonged exposure of the 
transformer T1 to fault current.  This is particularly true for 
lower fault levels downstream of CB1.  An adaptive 
protection scheme applied to this circuit could have rectified 
the problem by adjusting the overcurrent time multiplier 
setting of CB2’s protection in order to shorten the time delay 
and avoid stressing the network assets.  The failure of CB1 
will notify the protection scheme and the setting of CB2’s 
protection relay will be promptly switched to an alternative 
faster tripping one.  The operation sequence of the scheme is 
shown in Fig. 6 where the management and coordination 
functions run in parallel to the power system events and 
prompt the change of the protection setting controlling CB2 
to rapidly clear the fault. 
 
Fig. 4.  Laboratory based validation setup for testing the protection 
architecture.
  
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has highlighted the main drivers behind the 
need for WAPS and APS.  Their wide-scale adoption is 
challenged by the risk of unproven performance.  In order to 
gain a better understanding of the dynamics of such 
protection schemes, a layer-based distributed protection 
architecture has been proposed.  The architecture’s layers are 
abstracted functionally, but at the same time provide a holistic 
representation of WAPS and APS that are able to optimise 
their performance in any given network condition. 
Moreover, a laboratory based methodology is essential to 
validate the architecture.  This is delivered by the dynamic 
modelling environment and is complemented by a set of 
peripherals including primary power system models and 
physical protection devices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The environment effectively supports the architecture’s 
internal and external information exchange as well as enables 
the user to have a better visibility of the dynamics of the 
underlying architecture.  Further work is required to develop 
the functions of both the protection architecture and 
modelling the environment. Enhancements to the functional 
abstraction are also possible to improve the dynamic 
modelling of WAPS and APS.  
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Fig. 5.  Trip failure case study. 
 
Fig. 6.  Case study events sequence. 
